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MARITIME AVIATION LOSSES AND
CONFLICT OF LAWS
A. J. THOMAS, JR.*
INTRODUCTIONC ONFLICT OF LAWS problems arise in the maritime area
upon the national and international level. On the national level
the maritime law and maritime affairs are constitutionally regarded
as federal matters, for admiralty and maritime jurisdiction is a por-
tion of the judicial power conferred upon the courts of the United
States. Article II, Section 2 of the United States Constitution pro-
vides among other things that the judicial power shall extend to
all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. Nothing, how-
ever, is stated regarding the substantive law which is to be applied
to a case arising within the admiralty jurisdiction. A corpus of gen-
eral maritime law had arisen from European codes and practices
at the time of the adoption of the United States Constitution.'
This general maritime law was considered to have been received
or incorporated into the American law to be applied in maritime
cases.' The maritime law of the nation has come from this body of
traditional rules, subject to court modification and change requi-
site to meet the maritime needs of the United States. The maritime
law not only encompasses the general maritime law, but also
statutes of Congress.'
** B.S., 1939, Texas A&M University; LL.B., 1943, LL.M., 1943, University
of Texas at Austin; Doctor of Science of Law, 1951, University of Michigan;
William Hawley Atwell Professor of Constitutional Law, Dean Ad Interim of
the School of Law, Southern Methodist University.
I A summary of the ancient sea codes may be found in Thompson v. The
Catharina, 23 F. Cas. 1028 (D. Pa. 1795) (No. 13,949).
2See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 45-46 (1975). Herein
are discussed the theories relative to the receipt or incorporation of this law.
3 Id. at 47; see also N. HEALEY & D. SHARPE, ADMIRALTY CASES AND MATERIALS
1-27 (1974); G. ROBINsON, HANDBOOK OF ADMIRALTY LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES 9-13 (1939).
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If the maritime law is a federal matter, how can there be con-
flicts on the national level as to whether federal or state law should
be controlling in a case having a connection with navigable waters
and maritime concerns? In the first place not everything which
might have some connection to things maritime, such as mere
maritime locality, has been considered by the courts to be within
the admiralty judicial or legislative jurisdiction." If the subject
matter is non-maritime on the national level in the United States,
then the law of some state should obviously govern. Thus a court
decision that a set of facts is non-maritime will draw a line between
federal and state powers and jurisdiction. Even if the facts of the
case clearly indicate that the transaction and the parties to the
transaction are engaged in an activity of a maritime nature so as
to be within the admiralty jurisdiction and fall within established
precedent, there may still be instances when state law is to govern,
for the federal maritime power has not been construed by the
Supreme Court to be exclusively federal in all instances. In those
instances where that uniformity necessary to meet the needs of
the shipping industry is not demanded, but diversity of law can
be permitted, then state law can be applied.'
Conflict of laws problems may also arise on the international
level, for there may well be situations when the law of a foreign
nation should control even though the forum may be a court in
the United States. Choice of law principles may well indicate that
a United States statutory rule should not be applied when a differ-
ing and proper foreign rule should govern. Although it might be
advantageous if general admiralty principles were uniform world-
wide, this is far from the case. Different interpretations of rules
and even differing rules prevail, so that a choice must be made as
to which interpretation or which rule controls. Here conflict of laws
principles tell the court which rule or interpretation to select °
4 See the discussion pertaining thereto in Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City
of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 253-61 (1972).
1 Certain leading cases of the Supreme Court of the United States explanatory
of this problem are: Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731 (1961); Wilburn
Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955); Southern Pacific Co.
v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917). See also R. CRAMTON, D. CURIUE & H. KAY,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 958-69 (2d ed. 1975).
' See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 2, at 51-52.
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THE NATIONAL LEVEL
Maritime law has to do with the sea and navigable waters. It
relates to vessels and their crews, to navigation and to the marine
transport of persons and property. As such, aircraft and air trans-
port would appear to be unlikely candidates for admiralty juris-
diction and maritime law, and for the most part have been excluded
therefrom. Thus, the airplane is not generally the subject of a
maritime lien as is a vessel." The Limitation of Liability Act' does
not permit owners of aircraft to limit liability, for this act, by its
terms, applies only to vessels.' The maritime principle of general
average would seem to have no application to the airplane.1 The
Air Commerce Act of 192611 exempted aircraft from compliance
with navigation and shipping laws, but seaplanes, while afloat,
are now made subject to the International Rules of Navigation.
Nevertheless, in a limited number of circumstances the courts
have brought aircraft into admiralty.13 In an early case a seaplane
while afloat was considered to be within the admiralty jurisdic-
tion." Authority exists which holds that a seaplane which crashes
into navigable waters is a fit subject of salvage and of a maritime
lien for such salvage." Of more importance than these limited
' Comment, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1084, 1089 (1964); see United States v.
Northwest Air Serv., Inc., 80 F.2d 804, 805 (9th Cir. 1935).
846 U.S.C. S 181-189 (1976).
° Id.; see Noakes v. Imperial Airways, Ltd., 29 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1939);
Crenshaw, Airplanes in Admiralty Jurisdiction: A Short History, 18 S.C. L. REv.
572 (1966); Dollins v. Pan-American Grace Airways, Inc. 27 F. Supp. 487
(S.D.N.Y. 1939).
1 0 See Crenshaw, supra note 9, at 576.
1 44 Stat. 572, 49 U.S.C. § 177(a) (1952) (current version at 49 U.S.C. S
1509(a) (1976)).
1 Rule 1, The International Regulations for Prevention of Collisions at Sea,
33 U.S.C. 5 1602 (1976).
13See, e.g., Knauth, Aviation and Admiralty, 6 AIR L. REv. 226 (1935);
Veeder, The Legal Relation Between Aviation and Admiralty, 2 AIR L. REv. 29
(1931).
1 4Reinhardt v. Newport Flying Service Corp., 232 N.Y. 115, 117-18, 133
N.E. 371, 372 (1921).
15 Lambros Seaplane Base v. The Batory, 215 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1954). The
salvage award was discussed on other grounds. Therefore the case is not a clear-
cut decision that an admiralty lien will attach. The case is discussed in GILMORE
& BLACK, supra note 2 at 540. And see a recent case, Anthony Mark v. South
Continental Ins. Agency, Inc., 1978 A.M.C. 519, which also held that an airplane
crashing in navigable waters was a proper subject of admiralty.
19791
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
instances of aircraft and admiralty jurisdiction is the fact that ad-
miralty jurisdiction has been extended even to land-based aircraft
in cases of maritime tort, although there has been retraction of
such jurisdiction in certain instances where the tort arose from an
airplane which crashed into waters within one marine league from
shore.
In several cases arising from a crash within Boston Harbor-and
despite the fact that precedent at the time declared that there was
no general principle of maritime law creating an action for wrong-
ful death-federal courts held that admiralty jurisdiction was pres-
ent because the situs of the claim was within a maritime locality,
i.e., the crash and the alleged wrong occurred in navigable waters."
In these cases the action itself would be based upon the proper gov-
erning state's wrongful-death statute. The cases were founded on the
premise that admiralty jurisdiction in tort could be based merely
upon maritime locality despite the fact that no maritime relation-
ship or activity was involved.
These cases were overruled by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland." The
Court held that maritime locality alone was not sufficient for ad-
miralty jurisdiction in a tort action." In this case a plane enroute
from Cleveland to Portland, Maine, lost power upon engine inges-
tion of birds and fell, striking a perimeter fence at the Cleveland
Airport and finally crashing into Lake Erie, a maritime locality.
The crash occurred approximately one-fifth of a mile from shore.
No injuries resulted. Executive Jet Aviation brought suit against
1See, e.g., Scott v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 399 F.2d 14 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 979 (1968); Weinstein v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 316 F.2d
758 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 940 (1963). For a collection of cases, see
Annot., 39 A.L.R.3d 196 (1971).
17409 U.S. 249 (1972).
18 Controversy had long existed on the question of maritime jurisdiction in
tort. The old case of The Plymouth would determine the question of whether a
tort was maritime upon the locality of the wrong. The Court said: "Every species
of tort, however occurring, and whether on board a vessel or not, if upon the
high seas or navigable waters, is of admiralty cognizance." 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20,
36 (1865). See also the Supreme Court's language in Victory Carriers, Inc. v.
Law, 404 U.S. 202, 205 (1971). Some cases disagreed with the locality test and
set forth a view that there must in addition be a maritime connection for the
attachment of admiralty jurisdiction in tort. For a collection of cases pro and
con see J. LUCAN, ADMIRALTY CASES AND MATERIALS 104-06 (2d ed. 1978). See
also the extended discussion by the Supreme Court in Executive Jet Aviation, Inc.
v. City of Cleveland, supra note 4.
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the City of Cleveland for the loss of the plane, alleging the city's
negligence in failing to keep the airport free of birds or in failing
to give notice of their presence.
A lower court had held that the tort had occurred on land prior
to the final crash into the water."8 Thus, according to this decision
there was no maritime tort for there was no maritime locality. The
Supreme Court affirmed, but refused to decide the exact locality
of the tort. Instead, it was of the opinion that, even if the plane
came down on water so as to have a maritime locality, locality
alone could not make for admiralty jurisdiction or for the appli-
cation of maritime law in the absence of statutory authority. The
Court stated that the tort must bear "a significant relationship to
traditional maritime activity."" The Court went on to say that there
was no admiralty jurisdiction "over aviation tort claims arising from
flights by land-based aircraft between points within the continental
United States.""1 Such a cause of action is purely a state matter
calling for application of state laws, including state choice of law
principles.'
After deciding that a maritime locality test alone was not suffici-
ent, but that, in addition, a traditional maritime activity was
necessary for an assumption of maritime jurisdiction, the Court
turned to the issue of whether an aviation maritime tort could ever
bear a sufficient relation to traditional maritime activity to be
considered within admiralty. On this point the Court said:
It could be argued, for instance, that if a plane flying from New
York to London crashed in the mid-Atlantic, there would be ad-
miralty jurisdiction over resulting tort claims even absent a specific
statute. An aircraft in that situation might be thought to bear a
significant relationship to traditional maritime activity because it
would be performing a function traditionally performed by water-
borne vessels. Moreover, other factors might come into play in
the area of international air commerce--choice-of-forum problems,
choice-of-law problems, problems involving multi-nation conven-
tions and treaties, and so on."
19 Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 448 F.2d 151, 154 (6th
Cir. 1971), aff'd, 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
20 409 U.S. at 268.
21 Id. at 274.
22 Id. at 272-73.
2 Id. at 271-72 (footnote omitted).
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On the other hand, maritime relationship or activity could not
be found with respect to "an event [such as that occurring in Execu-
tive Jet] befalling a land-based plane flying from one point in the
continental United States to another.""u Such a fact situation did
not involve navigation and commerce on navigable waters.
A scattering of aviation cases have been decided by lower fed-
eral courts since Executive Jet.' Some courts have been able to
discover a sufficient maritime connection, in addition to maritime
locality, to sustain admiralty jurisdiction. In Higginbotham v.
Mobil Oil Corp.," a helicopter crashed while ferrying workmen
to a drilling platform in the Gulf of Mexico one hundred miles
from the Louisiana coast. Suit for damages was brought by repre-
sentatives of those who had perished in the crash. The test of
maritime locality was met because the accident occurred on the
high seas. The maritime activity test was also considered to have
been met because the helicopter was performing the functions of
a vessel, specifically those of a crew-boat. Since the aircraft was
neither performing a function of a land-based aircraft nor operat-
ing between points within the continental United States, but in-
stead was operating as a vessel, it was engaged in a maritime
activity."
The fact that the crash occurred between points in the United
States and not on the high seas seems to be the distinguishing fea-
ture in Teachey v. United States." A Coast Guard rescue heli-
copter, after successfully completing an air-sea rescue from a
sinking shrimp boat in the Gulf of Mexico, landed at Key West
for refueling. Thereafter it crashed off St. Petersburg, Florida. The
court held that the flight from Key West to St. Petersburg was a
flight by a land-based aircraft between points within the conti-
nential United States."' Thus the language of Executive Jet con-
trolled. The court did not rule concerning the contention that
rescue at sea was traditionally a function carried on by vessels.
2 1Id. at 272.
25 A discussion of some of these cases may be found in Note, 8 CAsE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 220 (1976); Note, 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 158 (1976).
26357 F. Supp. 1164 (W.D. La. 1973), modified, 545 F.2d 422 (5th Cir.
1977), rev'd on other grounds, 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
21 Id. at 1167.
28363 F. Supp. 1197 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
"Id. at 1199.
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Maritime relationship was also found in Hark v. Antilles Air-
boats, Inc.,' which involved a crash by a seaplane into the harbor
at St. Thomas, Virgin Islands, before the takeoff phase of the flight
had been completed. The destination was St. Croix, Virgin Islands.
The takeoff of a seaplane on navigable waters was thought to have
a maritime flavor. The court also stressed the maritime character,
for despite the fact that the flight was between two United States
points, much of the journey took place over the high seas. Execu-
tive Jet seemingly was to be restricted to flights between points in
the continental United States.
Roberts v. United States" latched on to the notion that trans-
oceanic transport of cargo was a traditional maritime activity, not-
ing the obvious, that in former times such shipping could only be
performed by waterborne vessels. Here the claims arose from the
crash of a private cargo plane into navigable waters as the plane
was approaching an airbase in Okinawa on a flight from Los
Angeles to Viet Nam. The court in T. J. Falgout Boats, Inc. v.
United States? was also influenced by tradition prior to the advent
of aviation. In that case a Navy jet released a missile which struck
a ship in California navigable waters. In the ensuing suit by the
vessel's owner, the court found maritime connection with the fol-
lowing language: "[B]efore the birth of aviation, the firing at sea
of explosive projectiles was performed only by waterborne ves-
sels."' Supporting reasons for maritime activity were cited: the
release of the missile over navigable waters created a potential
hazard to navigation; and further, the United States Navy existed
for the purpose of operating ships and aircraft in, on, and over
navigable waters.
Nevertheless, the court deciding American Home Assurance Co.
v. United States,' as in Teachey and unlike Roberts, Falgout Boats,
and Higginbotham, refused to be influenced by the traditional mari-
time function contention that the crash, occurring on a flight from
3 355 F. Supp. 683 (D.V.I. 1973). See also the later case Hubschman v.
Antilles Airboats, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 828 (D.V.I. 1977), which relied on the
Hark case.
31498 F.2d 520 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974).
32508 F.2d 855 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1000 (1975).
3id. at 857.
1389 F. Supp. 657 (M.D. Pa. 1975).
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Atlantic City, New Jersey, to an island off New York's coast, was
caused by inclement weather. Since weather problems were tradi-
tionally the bete noire of seamen, it was argued that a traditional
maritime connection was present. The court was unimpressed,
being of the opinion that coping with weather conditions was also
a problem of other vehicles and therefore not unique to seagoing
vessels or aircraft flying over the sea.
A final case worthy of mention is Hammill v. Olympic Airways,
S. A.' Here the wrongful-death action grew out of a crash in Greek
territorial waters while the plane was on an approach to the Athens
airport. One passenger killed was a United States citizen domiciled
in Virginia. The court again based its decision on the fact that
the flight served a purpose that had been traditionally carried on
by ships. The fact that it was not a transoceanic journey was dis-
counted, for the court stressed the fact that parts of the flight
occurred over international waters, and, further, a flight between
an island and the mainland was traditionally a function of a sur-
face vessel.
Issue can be and has been taken with the decisions of these courts
in the light of Executive Jet, but it must be admitted that the dicta
of that case which would permit an aviation tort to satisfy a mari-
time nexus in some instances is at best vague and contributes to
uncertainty with respect to the extension of admiralty jurisdiction
in the case of the maritime tort possessing certain sea or navigable
water connections. That which the Court appears to be emphasiz-
ing for the proper maritime connection necessary to bring the
matter within admiralty jurisdiction is either a flight outside the
jurisdiction of the United States and over international waters
avoiding "choice-of-forum problems, choice-of-law problems, inter-
national law problems, problems involving multi-nation conven-
tions and treaties, and so on,"' or a traditional and significant
maritime function. Sometimes both appear requisite, at other times
only one.
Somewhat akin to the maritime tort and admiralty jurisdiction
is the problem of implied warranty-aircraft-and the admiralty
jurisdiction. Two viewpoints exist here-one refusing to allow an
1398 F. Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 1975).
3 Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 272 (1972)
(footnote omitted).
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action for breach of a warranty of fitness of the aircraft within the
jurisdiction, and the other believing that such a cause of action
can, in instances, be considered maritime. Although a contract to
repair a ship is considered to be a maritime contract, a contract
to build a ship has been deemed to be outside admiralty's purview."
Such contracts have not been considered sufficiently related to
rights and duties pertaining to maritime commerce or navigation.
This rule, though subjected to much criticism, would be an ob-
stacle to admiralty jurisdiction for breach of implied warranty in
the manufacture of an aircraft. Moreover, even if such an obstruc-
tion could be overcome it would seem that some maritime connec-
tion would be requisite to permit admiralty to be seized of juris-
diction. In Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,"9 a predecessor of
Executive Jet, admiralty jurisdiction for maritime tort based upon
maritime locality alone was recognized. An action against the
manufacturer of the plane for breach of implied warranties of fit-
ness and merchantability was refused. The Court was of the opinion
that this was not a maritime contract, for such contracts rested
upon obligations maritime in nature which required the perform-
ance of maritime services or had to do with maritime transactions."
The contract was not believed to be of such nature, for involved
here was a transaction covering the manufacture "of a land-based
aircraft and a contract of carriage by air between two cities on the
United States mainland."" Mere maritime situs because of a crash
in navigable waters was thought to be incidental; it did not change
the character of the contract."1
The decision in Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co."
distinguished Weinstein and embraced admiralty jurisdiction. In
U Thames Towboat Co. v. The Schooner "Francis McDonald," 254 U.S. 242
(1920). See also General Engine & Machine Works, Inc. v. Slay, 222 F. Supp.
745 (S.D. Ala. 1963).
38 316 F.2d 758 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 940 (1963). Noel v. United
Aircraft Corp., 204 F. Supp. 929 (D. Del. 1962), also takes a position that
admiralty as a matter of law and policy does not take cognizance of a breach
of implied warranty. Here there was an action brought under the Death on the
High Seas Act against a manufacturer of propellers used on a plane that crashed
on the high seas.
39316 F.2d at 766.
4 Id.
41 Id.
' 231 F. Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd sub nor. Montgomery v. Good-
year Aircraft Corp., 392 F.2d 777 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 841 (1968).
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addition to a suit sounding in tort, the libellants alleged a breach
of implied warranty against Goodyear for negligent manufacture
of a Navy balloon. The balloon crashed on the high seas. The
claims were based on the Death on the High Seas Act" which
grants rights of recovery for negligent acts causing death on the
high seas. The court concluded that an action grounded on a
breach of implied warranty would lie under the Act." The Wein-
stein case was distinguished on the ground that the airplane's route
in Weinstein was not primarily over water as was that of the bal-
loon. A more substantial maritime connection was found in that
the balloon was manufactured for the Navy, and was intended to
be used over water. It was stated: "Given these facts, it was more
likely than not that a crash would take place over the water, and
so within admiralty jurisdiction."'
To overcome the fact that admiralty does not take cognizance
of contracts to build a vessel, the court mentioned that cases had
recognized implied warranties of workmanlike service as analogous
to a warranty by a supplier of the fitness of his product. Thus, it
was easy to take an additional step to recognize implied warranties
in an admiralty action, "especially when the warranties cover an
airship intended for flight over water and sold to the United States
Navy."" It was also noted that the recent trend was to characterize
personal injury and death actions, though based on warranty, as
in the nature of tort rather than as contract actions. Since the
case arose prior to Executive Jet, the court believed that as to a
tort action maritime locality was all that was needed for an exer-
cise of jurisdiction."
A later case, Krause v. Sud-Aviation, Societe Nationale de Con-
structions Aeronautiques,' reached a similar result. This case also
involved a suit under the Death on the High Seas Act issuing from
the crash of a helicopter in the Gulf of Mexico while ferrying
employees of an oil company to an off-shore oil rig. Here, the only
maritime connection was maritime locality, i.e. the aircraft was
"46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1976).
231 F. Supp. at 455.
41 Id. at 453.
4Id. at 454.
47 Id.
41301 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), a0'd, 413 F.2d 428 (2d Cir. 1969).
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operating over water. It would seem that after Executive Jet the
maritime connection or activity required by that case would have
been met. The fact that the aircraft was operating in international
waters, and was performing a traditional function of a crew-boat
might be sufficient,'9 although if we follow Montgomery, it might
be well that the manufacturer had no knowledge that there was
intention to use the aircraft on the high seas at the time of the
manufacturing process.
If an aviation tort or a cause of action based upon implied war-
ranty can be considered within the maritime jurisdiction, what law
is to govern the substantive legal issues in the case? In the cases
discussed, federal statutes or the general maritime law as viewed
by the United States controlled. It should be pointed out that on
a national level, and even when the case is one considered mari-
time, the maritime law does not always apply. State law is not
always dispossessed in maritime cases. If the matter thought mari-
time is local in scope so as not to require uniform and harmonious
working of the federal maritime legal system, the court may resort
to state law."° Unfortunately no clear-cut criteria exist to inform
us with certainty as to when uniformity is required or diversity of
laws permitted. Proceeding on an ad hoc case basis is not only
warranted, but requisite. 1
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins" and Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec-
tric Manufacturing Co.' require the application of the law of the
state in which a federal court is sitting in a case arising under di-
versity of citizenship jurisdiction. In such a case the federal courts
I See Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp., supra note 26.
50 For certain cases holding that an application of state law would upset the
harmony required for the maritime law and maritime affairs, see Kossick v.
United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731 (1961); Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244
U.S. 205 (1917); Taylor v. Crain, 224 F.2d 237 (3d Cir. 1955).
On the other side of the coin, where state law was permitted to displace the
maritime law, see Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310
(1955). Specifically as to aircraft and admiralty, see King v. Pan American World
Airways, 270 F.2d 355 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 262 U.S. 928 (1959), where, in
a claim based on the Death on the High Seas Act, the court held that such act
was not preemptive of a state's exclusive workmen's compensation statute. On
this subject generally, see GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 2, at 47-51; Currie,
Federalism and the Admiralty: "The Devil's Own Mess," 1960 Sup. CT. REV. 158.
" GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 2, at 49-50.
52 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
53313 U.S. 487 (1941).
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are also bound to the state's choice of law principle. The extent of
the application of the rules of the two above-mentioned cases has
not been a subject of much judicial decision vis-a-vis maritime
cases. Scott v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.," however, held that if the
tort was maritime, it was to be governed by federal choice of law
principles. Apparently the decision rested on the thought that uni-
formity in maritime affairs was required. The federal choice of laws
principles, when applicable, would usually fall within the idea of a
federal common law or be regarded as general principles of ad-
miralty law.
Of course state choice of law principles have no relevance to a
case when the choice of law is between federal maritime law and
the law of a foreign country, i.e., a conflict of laws problem on an
international level. Here federal choice of law principles control.
Thus federal choice of laws principles for a maritime cause on the
national as well as on the international level would ostensibly be
the same and can be discussed together.
THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL
The Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), section 761, cre-
ates a cause of action for wrongful death "whenever the death of a
person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default occur-
ring on the high seas beyond a marine league from the shore of
any State, or the District of Columbia, or the Territories or de-
pendencies of the United States."' The language of this act of
Congress has been held to encompass causes of action for wrong-
ful death which arise out of crashes of land-based aircraft on or
into the high seas." Moreover, the act has been held applicable
when the action arose on an airplane flying over the high seas
which never came in contact with the water." The extension of the
act to aviation wrongful-death actions on the high seas was based
on a literal reading of the statute, the language of which was not
54399 F.2d 14, 17 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 979 (1968); see also
Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 221 F.2d 189 (2d Cir. 1955).
-46 U.S.C. § 761 (1976).
"eHiga v. Transocean Airlines, 124 F. Supp. 13 (D. Hawaii 1954), aff'd,
230 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. dismissed, 352 U.S. 802 (1956); Wilson v.
Transocean Airlines, 121 F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
57 D'Aleman v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 259 F.2d 493 (2d Cir.
1958).
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confined to seaborne vessels, and the fact that the crash and action
arose in a maritime locality."'
The extent of the coverage of the DOHSA is not clear. As seen,
it has application to deaths caused by wrongful act beyond a ma-
rine league from shore-on the high seas. Insofar as its provisions
apply, no conflict of laws problems exist, for an American court
will be obliged to apply the federal statute as the supreme law of
the land. State or foreign law goes out the window and uniformity
under this section replaces diversity. Nevertheless, section 764 of
the act recognizes that there is room, even need, for the opera-
tion of a proper foreign law, for it proclaims:
Whenever a right of action is granted by the law of any foreign
State on account of death by wrongful act, neglect, or default
occurring upon the high seas, such right may be maintained in an
appropriate action in admiralty in the courts of the United States
without abatement in respect to the amount for which recovery is
authorized, any statute of the United States to the contrary not-
withstanding."
Until the 1970 case of Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc."
there was no federal common law maritime remedy for wrongful
death, although the DOHSA provided such a remedy if the death
occurred on the high seas. In Moragne a maritime common law
remedy was created by the court as a general principle of maritime
law. Cases following Moragne indicated that recovery in wrongful
death on the high seas could be predicated either on the DOHSA
or upon the general maritime law. 1 A recent Supreme Court deci-
sion disagrees and rules that such recoveries are governed by the
DOHSA.6 '
Admiralty jurisdiction also extends to personal injury cases
where death does not result, as well as to property injury cases,
where such actions arise from aircraft accidents over the high seas.
" See Annot., 66 A.L.R.2d 1002 (1959); Comment, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 243,
247 (1956).
5946 U.S.C. § 764 (1976).
-398 U.S. 375 (1970).
61 Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974); Hammill v. Olympic
Airways, S.A., 398 F. Supp. 829, 834-37 (D.D.C. 1975). See also GILMORE &
BLACK, supra note 2, at 369.
" Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 624-26 (1978).
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This extension was noted by the Supreme Court in Executive Jet."
Such cases were considered to be maritime torts because of mari-
time locality and because there was a maritime relationship. The
aircraft involved were beyond state territorial waters on trans-
oceanic flights. They were therefore performing a function tradi-
tionally and previously performed before the air age by ships."'
Death and personal injury proceedings are then cognizable in
admiralty. Applicable law will be the DOHSA or the general mari-
time law. Nevertheless, there may well be, and there are, fact situa-
tions where the application of American law should not be proper
even though the case is brought before an American court as the
forum. Indeed section 764 of the DOHSA recognizes, and the gen-
eral maritime law agrees, that general maritime choice of law
principles will at times call for foreign law to govern the issues
before the court.
Earlier conflict of laws theories stressed the law of the place of
injury or wrong as controlling in tort cases. Based on the fiction
that a vessel was an extension of the state, the courts concluded
that a maritime tort on the high seas would be governed by the
law of the state whose flag the vessel flew. This law was relied
upon as the law of the place of injury. Such a maritime tort, in-
volving only a single ship or place, would be governed by the law
of the flag of that vessel or plane. The problem became more
difficult when two or more vessels with differing flags were involved.
Here confusion existed with some authority applying the law of
the forum, other the law of the vessel carrying the injured party,
and still other the law of the vessel which caused the injury.'
In any event, the old vested rights theory based upon legislative
jurisdiction of a particular territorial state has given way to "gov-
ernmental interests" and "significant relationship" theories in ad-
miralty as well as in conflict of laws generally. Therefore, the law
of the state of the flag would not necessarily be the law to be chosen
simply because that state, and that state only, had jurisdiction to
63409 U.S. 249, 264 (1972).
"Id. See Notarian v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Pa.
1965); Bergeron v. Aero Assoc., 213 F. Supp. 936 (E.D. La. 1963).
6Ssee RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 406, 410 (1934); 2 J. BEALE,
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1328-32 (1935); ROBINSON, supra note 3, at 828-39;
M. HANCOCK, TORTS IN CONFLICT OF LAws 271 (1942); Note, 31 TEx. L. REv.
889 (1953); 3 INT'L & COmP. L.Q. 115 (1954).
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create rights. Emphasis is now placed upon the application of the
law of the place having the most significant interest or relationship
to the issue at hand for decision."
Although the case of Lauritzen v. Larsen was not concerned
with a maritime tort on the high seas, but with the question as to
whether a Danish seaman could recover for negligence under the
Jones Act, the Supreme Court of the United States indicated that
the court should engage in a weighing of contacts test in order
to determine whether American law or the law of some foreign
nation having contact with the fact situation should be applicable.
This notion was later extended in Romero v. International Termi-
nal Operating Co.6' In this case it also became clear that the
Lauritzen principle and contacts were intended to guide the courts
in the application of the maritime law generally. Seven points of
contact were set out in Lauritzen to serve as guideposts for choice
of law: the place of the wrongful act, the vessel's flag, the allegiance
or domicile of the injured, the allegiance of the ship owner, the
place of contracting, the inaccessibility of a foreign forum, and
the forum.6 In a later case, Hellenic Lines v. Rhoditis,"' it was
determined that the seven guideposts of Lauritzen were not in-
tended to be exhaustive for another factor was added-the ship-
owner's base of operations. 1
A series of cases brought for wrongful death on the high seas
have followed the theory of these Supreme Court cases. In Noel
v. Airponents, Inc.,"6 a New Jersey federal district court had be-
fore it an action arising from a death caused by the crash of a
Venezuelan airliner on the high seas. Libellants claimed that
American law controlled, specifically the DOHSA. Respondent
claimed that the law of Venezuela should be applied, inasmuch as
66 For a short history of conflict of laws theories see R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN
CONFLICTS LAw 6-7 (1968). See also H. GOODRICH & E. SCOLES, CONFLICT OF
LAws 3-9 (4th ed. 1964).
67345 U.S. 571 (1953).
68 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
" 345 U.S. at 583-9 1. For discussion of these cases see H. BAER, ADMIRALTY
LAW OF THE SUPREME COURT § 5-1 (2d ed. 1969).
7 398 U.S. 306 (1970). For discussion of this case see Note, 6 J. INT'L L.
& ECON. 187 (1971).
7 398 U.S. at 309.
72 169 F. Supp. 348 (D.N.J. 1958).
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the traditional maritime law would point to the application of the
law of the flag to a tort occurring on a vessel on the high seas.
The court disagreed, pointing out the following facts: no action for
wrongful death was permitted by Venezuelan law; the claim for
damages was not against a Venezuelan carrier, but against an
American corporation which had serviced the plane before its de-
parture from New York; and the decedent, as well as the plaintiffs,
were American nationals. The court then concluded that neither
the Venezuelan carrier nor the state of registry, Venezuela, had
an interest in the litigation. Therefore, according to the Lauritzen
formula the claim was governed by American law, the DOHSA.
The court quoted from Lauritzen as follows:
Maritime law like our municipal law, has attempted to avoid or
resolve conflicts between competing laws by ascertaining and
valuing points of contact between the transaction and the states
or governments whose competing laws are involved. The criteria,
in general, appear to be arrived at from weighing of the signifi-
cance of one or more connecting factors between the shipping
transaction regulated and the national interest served by the asser-
tion of authority."8
Noel v. United Aircraft Corp.' also involved the death of an
American citizen caused by the same crash. The case was before
a Delaware United States district court. The defendant, as in the
previous case, was an American citizen. Again it was claimed that
the case should be governed by Venezuelan law, the law of the
airline's flag. Experts on Venezuelan law agreed that recovery was
precluded under Venezuelan law, but it was also shown that Vene-
zuela's choice of law principles would look not to the law of the
flag, but to the law of the place where the negligence occurred,
which was the United States. The court then became concerned
with the principles of renvoi; that is, the forum was looking to the
conflict of laws principles of the foreign state rather than to its
internal law. By so doing the court was referred by the foreign
conflicts rule back to the law of the forum, the place of negligence.
This can result in a game of international lawn tennis with the
case never being decided until the law of some concerned state
"Id. at 351 (quoting from Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 582 (1953)).
1202 F. Supp. 556 (D. Del. 1962).
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drops the ball.' The court apparently did satisfy itself that Vene-
zuela would apply American law. Thus, no Venezuelan policy
would be infringed by the application by the court of United States
law. Therefore, the DOSHA was found applicable because of the
significant contacts and relationships under the doctrine of
Lauritzen."
The crash of this Venezuelan airliner was the basis of still an-
other cause of action in Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana."
Here suit was brought before a United States district court in New
York for damages for conscious pain and suffering and for mental
anguish of the surviving spouse and children. Such damages were
not allowed under the DOHSA, but they were under Venezuelan
law. The libel was based on section 764 of the DOHSA rather
than section 761 which was the basis in the previous cases. Section
764 grants relief by the law of any foreign state arising from
death on the high seas. Former cases which had applied American
law were distinguished. The conclusion was reached that Lauritzen
demanded the application of Venezuelan law. In the previous
cases the suits were against American corporations, the acts of
negligence charged had occurred within the United States, and
the claims were presented under section 761 of the DOHSA, which
in general creates an action for wrongful death on the high seas.
Here the defendant and its aircraft were Venezuelan, some of the
negligent acts occurred in Venezuela, the impact of these acts
occurred on the high seas, and the claim was grounded on section
764 of the DOHSA.
A different decision was reached by the court of the southern
district of New York in an earlier case involving still another
proceeding based upon this Venezuelan airlines crash. In Fernan-
dez v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana,8 libel was brought for the
death of a stewardess on the ill-fated plane. Respondents claimed
that section 761 of the DOHSA does not create a cause of action
when death occurs on a foreign plane on the high seas; hence it
7' On the subject of renvoi see In Re Schneider's Estate, 198 Misc. 1017, 96
N.Y.S.2d 652 (Sur. Ct. 1950); Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 HARv. L. REv.
1165 (1938).
" See note 69 and accompanying text.
"v 260 F. Supp. 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
11 156 F. Supp. 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). On this case see Note, 67 YALE L.J.
1445 (1958).
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was not applicable. To the contrary, section 764 should be the sole
basis of recovery upon a cause of action granted by foreign law.
The court differed and indicated its belief that the remedies under
the two sections were cumulative, not mutually exclusive. It said
that the act maintained rights under foreign law and gave an addi-
tional right under section 761. It was of the opinion that to make
section 764 exclusive when death occurred on a foreign aircraft
would be a harsh rule if there were no wrongful-death action under
the foreign law. This, it was believed, the Congress did not intend.
Therefore, a cause of action under section 761 was deemed to be
present."m
The court then felt compelled to deal with the Lauritzen prin-
ciple and reached the conclusion that Lauritzen would not have
significance as to section 761 of the DOHSA, for in that case the
court had before it the application of the Jones Act, which was
considered substantive. Section 761 of the DOHSA, it said, was
procedural in character and therefore available in all cases as the
rule of the forum. Such reasoning would accord with conflict of
laws principles that matters of procedure are governed by the law
of the forum. The weight of authority, however, holds wrongful-
death statutes to be substantive, as creating new rights."* On this
ground the court seems to be in error.
With regard to the contention that a cause of action was afforded
by Venezuelan law, the court said that the Venezuelan law was
not pleaded in conjunction with the cause of action based on sec-
tion 761 and that any further cause of action grounded on Vene-
zuelan law could not be presented for Venezuelan law had not
been pleaded with sufficient certainty. As a result uncertainty pre-
vailed as to whether a cause of action under Venezuelan law could
be said to exist.
Bergeron v. Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij'1 dealt with
actions for the deaths of United States citizens which had occurred
on an aircraft of Netherlands' registry when it crashed into the
Atlantic Ocean. The principal issue here, as in the previous case,
71 156 F. Supp. at 95-98.
" The place of injury governed in wrongful-death actions. See RESTATEMENT,
supra note 65, §§ 391-397; Note, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1152 (1958).
"1 188 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), appeal dismissed, 299 F.2d 78 (2d
Cir. 1962).
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was the availability of an action under section 761 when a foreign
flag aircraft which might be governed by section 764 was involved.
The libellant had pleaded section 761 as grounds for relief. She also
claimed a cause of action under Dutch law pursuant to section
764 of the DOHSA. A cause of action did exist under Dutch law.
The court adopted the approach of Noel v. Airponents, that
wrongful death was regarded as substantive and the Lauritzen fac-
tors are applied. Therefore, section 761 is not limited to suits
against American aircraft. It is also available in suits against foreign
aircraft upon a finding of dominant and germane contacts. The
court stated that Congress did not intend there should be no re-
covery for American citizens dying on the high seas, just because
their deaths had occurred on a foreign aircraft. Thus section 761
should be resorted to when no recovery is available under foreign
law, but when a basis for recovery under foreign law is present
and sufficiently pleaded, there is no reason not to resort to section
764 which calls for application of foreign law unless an examina-
tion of all contacts indicates a more significant relationship to
American law. The application of sections 761 and 764 is on the
basis of the contacts and their importance as set out in Lauritzen.
The court concluded that concurrent causes of action could not
be maintained and dismissed claims based on section 761. Dutch
law was applied under section 764 because the contacts of the
Netherlands so demanded.'
It should be noted that in following the Lauritzen v. Larsen
philosophy and the system of contacts advanced by that case, these
decisions, as Lauritzen itself, are a far cry from interest analysis
ideas developed over recent years by non-admiralty conflict of
laws cases and by jurists of the United States. The new theories
which have had widespread acceptance were a revolt against the
old vested rights theory whereby, in a situation with a foreign fact
element, each case was decided according to the law of the state
or nation having territorial jurisdiction because the case could be
controlled only by the law of such state. Only the state of injury
could create the right in a tort situation, in a land title case, the law
of the situs of the property, and in a problem having to do with
personal status, the law of the domicile.
"See, e.g., Haag v. Barnes, 9 N.Y.2d 554, 175 N.E.2d 441, 216 N.Y.S.2d
65 (1961).
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In breaking away from this theory the courts began to weigh
the contacts when two or more states were connected with the
transaction, seeking to apply the law of the place having the most
dominant contacts. This often ended up in a counting of contacts.
in order to reach a decision and an application of the law of the
state having the most quantitative contacts. This again resulted in
a mechanical decision. What was really wanted was not such a
mere counting of contacts, but a weighing and balancing of inter-
ests in order to see if a state's policy or purpose would be served
by the application of a contact state's law to the issue or issues at
hand. If not, that law was not to be applied and the law of the
state would govern which did have an interest in the application of
its laws. If two or more states had an interest, then a weighing and
balancing process had to ensue to discover the most significant
interest or relationship.'
In the cases discussed above we find very little interest analysis.
Language of Justice Frankfurter in Romero, however, does imply
something more than a mere totting up of contacts. He stated:
"The controlling considerations are the interacting interests of the
United States and of foreign countries, and in assessing them we
must move with the circumspection appropriate when this Court
is adjudicating issues inevitably entangled in the conduct of our
international relations."'" Herein is suggested policy interests of
two or more nations which should be taken into account before
the application of this or that particular law.
In the DOHSA cases discussed above there appears to be little
interest analysis on a qualitative basis. True the courts applying
the Lauritzen contacts notion do look to the interests of the United
States and the purposes of the DOHSA and the intentions of the
Congress in enacting it, but they do not seem really concerned
with making an analysis as to the interests of the foreign state or
the policies behind the law of the foreign state. In Noel v. Linea
83 For critical discussion of the cases see Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion
in New York, 1963 DUKE L.J. 1; Ehrenzweig, The "Bastard" in the Conflict of
Laws-A National Disgrace, 29 U. CI. L. REV. 498 (1962). See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 5 6 (1971). See also, Leflar, supra note 66,
ch. 11; Cheatham & Reese, Choice -of The Applicable Law, 52 COLUM. L. REV.
959 (1952); Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 L. &
CONTEMP. PROB. 679 (1963).
-358 U.S. 354, 383 (1959).
MARITIME LOSSES
Aeropostal Venezolana" where those seeking recovery were Ameri-
cans, the court said Venezuelan law controlled because the air-
line was Venezuelan, acts of negligence occurred in Venezuela
having impact on the high seas, and the parties sought to recover
under section 764 of the DOHSA. No real determination as to
whether Venezuela would have an interest in the application of
its law to protect American citizens was made. Perhaps the policy
existed, but the court did not see fit to explore the matter.
Today the most significant relationship doctrine is used primarily
to denote the system adopted by the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws. This is based upon a consideration of certain
choice of law principles which should influence the courts in mak-
ing the proper decision as to the governing law. These policy values
which are influencing factors are: (a) the needs of the interstate
and international systems; (b) the relevant policies of the forum;
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relevant
interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue;
(d) the protection of justified expectations; (e) the basic policies
underlying the particular field of law; (f) certainty, predictability,
and uniformity of result; and (g) ease in the determination and
application of the law."
Although the new Restatement was published after these cases
were decided, the choice of law principles were known previous
to its publication. The courts looked into some of these policy
factors in making decisions in the cases at hand, but no formal
allusion to them or consideration of them was made by any of
the judges. Properly, each choice of law factor should be examined
to determine whether or not it has import with respect to the issue
at hand. If not, it should be disregarded; if so, it will remain for
consideration after making determination as to all other policy
factors. In this way the law of the state having the most significant
relationships vis-a-vis the choice of law factors can be determined
and its law applied.
A recent decision by the Second Circuit, Benjamins v. British
European Airways,"' may well have limited the force of the DOHSA
insofar as that act is to be applied in its entirety to high seas crashes
260 F. Supp. 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
88 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), note 83, supra.
87 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir.), appeal pending, - U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. 74 (1978).
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occurring on international flights where the air carrier's registry is
that of a nation adhering to the Warsaw Convention." This case
reversed previous cases decided by the circuit which had held that
the Warsaw Convention did not in and of itself create a cause of
action despite the language of Article 17 of the Convention which
provided:
The carrier shall be liable for damages sustained in the event
of the death or wounding of a passenger or any bodily injury
suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage
so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of
any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.
Article 18(1) provides further that the carrier shall be liable for
damage for loss, destruction, or damage to baggage or goods if
the damage is sustained during the air transportation.
The courts had consistently concluded that the Warsaw Con-
vention only established conditions and standards for a cause of
action which itself had to be created by domestic law. The Con-
vention established no independent cause of action."' Thus, for a
death occurring on an international flight on or over the high
seas, to which the Warsaw Convention would apply, the American
courts have held that the cause of action was, created by American
law, the DOHSA, rather than by the Warsaw Convention." Once
a cause of action was found to be created by a proper domestic
law, then of course recovery thereon would be modified or con-
trolled by the terms of the Convention to the extent that it was
pertinent. Since the Warsaw Convention limits the liability of the
carrier to a sum certain in the absence of contractual arrangements
providing otherwise," such limitation of liability would be observed
as to recovery under the DOHSA. Situations could arise, however,
when the Convention might not be thought to govern. Even under
the DOHSA or the general maritime law in personal injury cases
11 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air, opened for signature, December 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S.
No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter cited as Warsaw Convention].
"See, e.g., Komlos v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 209 F.2d 436 (2d
Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 820 (1954); Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Vene-
zelos, 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957). See also
1 L. KREINDLER, AVIAON ACCIDENT LAW § 11.08 (1978).
"Warsaw Convention, supra note 88.
91 Id. at art. 22.
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on the high seas, the principles of Lauritzen might well point to
law other than that of the United States as controlling." Presum-
ably, adherents to the Warsaw Convention would possess a law
creating a cause of action, but what if all did not? Even if a cause
of action were created, it could not be said with certainty that a
limit of recovery lower than that provided by the Convention would
not prevail if contained in the very law creating the cause of
action.' In any event, the Benjamins case, if followed, will solve
the problem by recognizing that the need for uniformity in inter-
national air law demanded by the Warsaw Convention can best
be met by the recognition of its terms as a universal source of a
right of action. Consequently American courts should now view the
Warsaw Convention as the creator of the cause of action in cases
within its scope, rather than, in high seas situations, the DOHSA
or the general maritime law.
Torts occurring within the territorial waters of a nation as con-
trasted with maritime torts occurring in and over the high seas,
were subjected to different rules according to earlier decisions.
In general, liability for a tort committed within the territorial
waters of a state or nation was said to be governed by the laws of
that state or nation. An exception was made, however, as to those
torts which were concerned with or which affected the internal
management or discipline of the vessel. Although occurring on a
ship within the territorial waters the rule viewed the proper law
as that of the nations whose flag the vessel flew." Today the choice
of law principles in these instances would presumably follow the
significant contacts or relationship theory as set forth in Lauritzen
v. Larsen. In a proper situation a court, after weighing competing
interests of two or more nations involved, would decide that the
" This argument would be difficult to make under the DOHSA, for section
764 speaks of the application of foreign law when a cause of action is given
by that law. Thus, if no cause of action existed, the wrongful-death cause of
action created by the DOHSA would ostensibly apply. Even here there could pre-
sumably be cases where the United States and its law had absolutely no interest
in the parties or the issues. In such an instance it might be contended that no
part of United States law should govern, and the case should be governed by a
proper foreign law which may or may not provide a cause of action.
"For criticism of the cases holding that the Convention created no inde-
pendent cause of action see Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States and
the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REv. 497, 517, 519 (1967); Moore & Pealez,
Admiralty Jurisdiction-The Sky's the Limit, 33 J. AIR L. & COM. 3, 27 (1967).
"RESTATEMENT, supra note 65 at § § 404-405.
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law of the nation having the most significant interest should be
applied.
Executive Jet solves many problems with respect to most mari-
time torts arising from crashes of American aircraft in American
territorial waters. Such torts would usually not be viewed as falling
within the admiralty jurisdiction or law. Liability would be based
on state law. Admiralty and maritime law including maritime con-
flict of laws could possibly become of importance and applicable if
there existed not only a maritime locality, but also some other mari-
time connection, e.g., following the dicta in Executive Jet, a trans-
oceanic flight which ended in a crash in the navigable waters of the
United States. There appear to be no cases involving such facts.
There is also a dearth of aviation tort cases when the tort oc-
curred within the territorial waters of another nation. Hammill v.
Olympic Airways, S.A."' is one such case. In that case a Greek
airliner crashed in the territorial waters of Greece. A wrongful-
death action was brought by the administrator of the estate of an
American passenger who was killed in the crash. The court found
maritime jurisdiction and applied the general maritime law which
created a federal cause of action for wrongful death. The court
did not find it necessary to determine whether the DOHSA applied,
inasmuch as the court believed that the results would be practically
the same under the DOHSA or the general maritime principle of
wrongful death.
It has been suggested that the DOHSA may be considered applic-
able to deaths within a foreign nation's territorial waters, for it is
thought that the Congress intended to fix the one marine league
limitation as a marine league from American shores. Waters be-
yond a marine league from American shores would be considered
to be high seas even though within foreign territorial waters."'
If this be true, then the DOHSA should have been applied, par-
ticularly in view of the later decision of the United States Supreme
Court to the effect that the DOSHA, when applicable,' was in-
tended to preclude the availability of recovery under the general
maritime law. If the DOHSA had been applied, different results
9 398 F. Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 1975).
"Roberts v. United States, supra note 31, at 524; Comment, 51 CALIF. L.
REV. 389, 397 (1963).
97 Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978).
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could well have occurred, for as we have seen, section 764 of the
DOHSA requires, in some situations, the applicability of the law
of a foreign state when a right of action is granted by that state.
Even under general maritime law principles, Greek law should
have been given some consideration in light of Lauritzen and its
progeny. The defendant contended that Greek law should control
so as to oust the District of Columbia court from jurisdiction.
Greece, unlike the United States, has adopted the Warsaw Con-
vention even as to claims arising from Greek domestic flights.
Under that Convention the United States is not one of the requi-
site four places for purposes of suit: the domicile of the carrier; the
principal place of business of the carrier; the place where the con-
tract had been made; or the place of destination." Moreover, the
District of Columbia court was not sitting within the territory of
a contracting party.
Over and above the jurisdictional question, the defendant urged
that plaintiff should plead and prove Greek law as a basis for the
cause of action. Since plaintiff had failed to do so, he had not
stated a claim. These contentions were ignored by the court both
as to the DOHSA and the general maritime law. The case is an
illustration of a general tendency of American courts in admiralty
cases to consider American law as controlling, i.e., the law of the
forum is applied." Under Lauritzen, American admiralty should
proceed on some weighing of competing interests of states when
there is a conflict between American and foreign law. In Lauritzen
it may well have been that Greece and its law and policy had a
very vital interest in this transaction and at least one of the parties,
the air carrier. Under these circumstances Greece may well have
had the predominant interest. To resort to the American law with-
out a consideration of foreign interest seems to do violence to the
notion that American courts should accord respect for the inter-
ests of foreign nations in the interest of maritime commerce for
this is a legitimate concern of the international community.
"Art. 28(1), Warsaw Convention, note 88 supra. And see discussion of
these points in Note, 8 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 220, 230-39 (1976).
9 A. EHRENZWEIG, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 196-99 (1967).
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